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Sammendrag 
I denne artikklen undersøker vi virkningen av offentlig støtte til forsknings- og utviklingsinnsats på 
omfanget av patentering i norske foretak. Vi analyserer både skattefradragsordningen SkatteFUNN og 
direkte FoU-støtte fra Norges Forskningsråd og Innovasjon Norge. Vi finner at både direkte støtte og 
SkatteFUNN har positive effekter på patentering. Effektens omfang er imidlertid avhengig av 
foretakenes egenskaper før de får støtte. De statistisk signifikante estimatene er alle relatert til foretak 
uten tidligere patentsøknader, dvs. før de mottar støtte. Videre anslår vi at direkte støtte har utløst 
minst tre ganger så mange innvilgede patenter per krone i støtte sammenlignet med SkatteFUNN. Våre 
resultater tyder på at FoU-støtte bør gis til foretak med stort potensiale for å innovere, snarere enn 
foretak som allerede har innovert – iallfall gjelder dette mht. patenterbare innovasjoner. Videre, siden 
vi finner at målrettede subsidier genererer flere innovasjoner enn SkatteFUNN, tyder våre resultater på 
at samfunnet vil dra nytte av å distribuere mer av støttene til prioriterte områder enn det som har vært 
tilfellet til nå. 
 
1 Introduction
Many countries undertake policies aiming to increase research and develoment (R&D) activity,
since a strict reliance on a market system may result in underinvestment in R&D and innovation
activities, relative to the socially desirable level (Griliches, 1992; Martin and Scott, 2000; Hall and
van Reenen, 2000). Market failures arise because of e.g. external knowledge spillovers, limited
appropriability and financial constraints. In this paper we examine the impact of two different
innovation policy instruments on Norwegian firms’ innovation, measured by the propensity to
patent. The innovation policies considered are the Norwegian R&D tax credit scheme Skattefunn
and the two major sources of direct R&D subsidies in Norway: The Research Council of Norway
and Innovation Norway.1 Innovation policies to support private R&D activities should in prin-
ciple reflect the size of the external spillovers from the research (Goulder and Schneider, 1999;
Straathof et al., 2014). Even if such spillovers are found to differ between innovating firms, they
are difficult to measure. The Norwegian R&D tax credit scheme is “technology neutral” in the
sense that it offers the same subsidies for any type of technology or sector. On the other hand,
both the Research Council and Innovation Norway offer specific programs targeted at specific
industries or technologies (e.g. environmental technologies).
A common argument against direct subsidies is that the state should not try to “pick
winners”. In line with this view, tax incentives have become an increasingly popular policy
tool over the last decades.2 Nevertheless, Mazzucato (2013) argues that we need to shift the
focus away from the worry that the state is picking winners, and towards the needs of complex,
network dependent innovation sectors. When policy makers target priority technology areas as
with direct subsidies, they are aware that such projects typically involve a higher risk of failure,
even if the project has a high potential value. The tax credit scheme, on the other hand, does
not take into account that particular technologies are exposed to greater market failures than
others, e.g. environmental technologies (Acemoglu et al., 2012), public good issues (Calel and
Dechezleprêtre, 2016), and possible larger knowledge externalities (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2013;
Mazzucato, 2013).
1Innovation Norway is a government body for promoting industry development.
2R&D tax incentive schemes are widely adopted in advanced economies including the United States, Japan,
and all EU countries except Germany and Estonia (Straathof et al., 2014).
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We use Norwegian firm level registry data on patents which have been assigned to firm
identification numbers, allowing us to merge data on patents with various other registry data
sets, such as innovation policy databases. These data have full coverage of limited liability
firms with detailed accounting and employment information. We will refer to the combined
data as the Business Register. We merge the Business Register with survey data on firms’
R&D-expenditures. The R&D survey data combine two sources: the annual R&D census and
questionnaire data from firms that have applied for tax credits. The questionnaire data contain
information about R&D expenditures each year during the three previous years.3 Combining the
two R&D surveys enables us to track the recent R&D history of about 85 percent of the firms
that obtained any form of public R&D support during the observation period (see below).
We contribute to the existing literature in three ways. First, we investigate potential
differences in the propensity to patent between the response of a technology neutral R&D tax
credit scheme and direct R&D subsidies on innovation in general. Second, we are able to include
all the major sources of R&D subsidy programs in one country in our analysis; both direct
subsidies (grants) and tax credits, and to study the effects of these programs. Although there
are other studies that address multiple sources of public support (e.g. Czarnitzki and Lopes-
Bento, 2013 and Dumont, 2017), we are, to the best of our knowledge, the first to analyse the
impact on an innovation outcome (patenting) of all major sources of support in one country over
a relatively long period of time (2002–2013).4 Third, according to both theoretical and empirical
approaches to the economics of innovation (see Cohen, 2010, for a literature overview), specific
characteristics of firms are also likely to influence innovation. Our rich data set allows us to
control for observed firm heterogeneity through a wealth of control variables.
There is a large literature on the effects of public R&D support on private R&D, for
example, Almus and Czarnitzki (2003) find positive effects on the R&D intensity, and both
Lokshin and Mohnen (2013) and Moretti and Wilson (2014) find positive effects on R&D. Bøler
et al. (2015) find that the introduction of the Norwegian R&D tax credit scheme in 2002–2003
had positive effects on R&D. However, increased R&D expenditures is not equivalent to more
innovations. For instance, nominal R&D expenses might increase because firms adapt to the
3See Section 4.2 in Benedictow et al. (2018) for a description of this data set.
4In a related study, Nilsen et al. (2018) analyse the impact of public R&D support in Norway on firms’ output
and employment growth, labour productivity and returns on assets, but not on innovation outcomes.
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policies by reclassifying spending that they otherwise would not have characterized as R&D.
Tax credit schemes could be particularly vulnerable to such adaptations. Relatively few studies
investigate the effect of R&D subsidies on innovation outcomes. Among them are Bronzini and
Iachini (2014) and Bronzini and Piselli (2016) who both find positive effects on patenting of an
R&D subsidy program in northern Italy. Dechezleprêtre et al. (2016) find that tax deductions
for R&D expenses in the UK increased the propensity to patent. Cappelen et al. (2012) find
that the introduction of R&D tax credits in Norway contributed to an increase in (self-reported)
new products and processes, but not to more patent applications.
Earlier studies of the Norwegian tax credit scheme utilize that tax credits are capped at
R&D expenditures exceeding a certain threshold (e.g. Bøler et al., 2015; Hægeland and Møen,
2007). However, the identification strategies used typically do not take into account that firms
may apply for funding from multiple sources or apply many times.5 Our approach is to use a
quasi-experimental design where firms that received support (treated firms) are matched with a
control group according to the pre-treatment characteristics of the supported firms.
We find that both direct subsidies and tax credits have significant positive effects on patent-
ing. However, we estimate that direct subsidies have triggered almost three times as many granted
patents per NOK million in support compared to tax credits. Nevertheless, the effects depend
critically on the firms’ pre-treatment characteristics. In particular, we find that the public poli-
cies only give incentives for more patenting among firms with no patent applications prior to
obtaining support. When we control for firms’ R&D experience and their history of patenting,
we find no evidence that other variables, such as firm-size or firm-age, have a separate impact
on the efficiency of the R&D-support schemes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains a description of the data
and the variables used in the empirical analysis. The econometric model is presented in Section 3
and the results in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes and suggests some policy implications.
5A part of the identification strategy is that the tax credit scheme is assumed to lower the marginal cost of
R&D only for firms with R&D expenditures below the cap prior to the introduction of the scheme (in 2002–2003).
However, this assumption is less plausible when firms have access to several sources of funding as in our study, or
can make intertemporal adjustments. For example, the fact that the number of Skattefunn projects in Norway
dropped substantially just after its implementation phase (2002-2003) (see Figure 2.2. in Benedictow et al., 2018),
suggests that some R&D projects may have been postponed to benefit from the introduction of the scheme, rather
than having been triggered by it.
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2 Data sources and description of variables
Drawing on administrative sources and survey data, we have prepared a firm-level panel data
set spanning the years from 1995 to 2014, except for the data on innovation polices and the
related R&D questionnaire data, which are collected from 2002, when the tax credit scheme was
introduced in Norway, and onwards.
The Norwegian patent data contain unique firm identification numbers that allow for a
reliable match of the patent data to the other data sets.6 Data on innovation policies are
gathered from three different sources: Innovation Norway’s databases, the PROVIS database
from the Research Council of Norway and the Skattefunn database. These data sources are used
to obtain information related to R&D support for all the firms in the Business Register from
2002 and onwards.7
To be able to distinguish between firms with regard to the level of their R&D activity prior
to the receipt of R&D support, is particularly important in order to identify causal effects of
the policies. Otherwise we risk confusing the effect of doing R&D (which cet. par. increases the
probability of obtaining R&D support) with the effect of the policy itself. Our primary source of
information about firms’ R&D expenditure is the Business R&D census.8 It is mandatory for all
firms that are included in the sample selected by Statistics Norway. This sample covers all firms
in the business enterprise sector with at least 50 employees. Among firms with 10-49 employees,
stratified random samples of about 30 percent of the population are drawn each year in the
main R&D industries (2-digit NACE), with smaller shares in the other industries. Firms with
5-9 employees are also included in the census, but the coverage is much smaller for these firms.
Regardless of size or industry, all firms that reported significant R&D activity in the previous
survey remain included in the next one.
Firms included in the R&D census account for about 50 percent of both the total number of
6In most countries, there is no unique identifier allowing researchers to link intellectual property information
directly to other firm-level data (Helmers et al., 2011). Instead, the names indicated on patent documents,
including assignee and inventor names, and the firm names contained in firm-level databases are used to merge
data sets. For example, PATSTAT and the US patent office provide identifications only by names. Even if the
patent offices have harmonized the name use within their organizations, name harmonization with other data
sources is challenging (Helmers et al., 2011; Tarasconi and Kang, 2015).
7If more than one firm participates in a project, the data from the PROVIS-database are only available for
the main contractor firm.
8The census has been annual since 2001 and was bi-annual from 1995 to 1999.
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patents in the Business Register and a similar share of total R&D support. Thus, the sole reliance
on the R&D census for the classification of firms with regard to their R&D activity would mean
that about half of the support had, from the outset, to be excluded from the estimation sample.
Even more importantly, the sample would not be representative of the population of supported
firms, as mainly medium sized and large firms are included in the census. Fortunately, we are
able to supplement the R&D census with questionnaire data from the Skattefunn applications
regarding each of the applicants’ R&D expenditures three years prior to applying. These data are
collected by the The Research Council of Norway and include information on R&D expenditures
for most firms included in the Skattefunn database.
A detailed description of key variables is provided below, where they are grouped into three
main categories: measures of innovation (Section 2.1), measures of innovation policies (Section
2.2), and determinants of innovation (Section 2.3).
2.1 Innovation measures
We use register data on patent applications and granted patents as measures of innovation. In
contrast, innovation measures based on surveys, such as the Community Innovation Survey (CIS),
may be prone to measurement errors as they depend on the respondents’ own judgement and
accuracy. Comparing the data from the Norwegian CIS with registered patent applications from
the Norwegian Patent Office, reveals substantial discrepancies both with regard to the timing and
number of patent registrations, raising serious concerns about the quality of the (self-reported)
CIS data.
It is common but not uncontroversial to use patent counts as a measure of innovation (see
e.g. the discussion in Bronzini and Piselli, 2016). An important argument in favour of using
patent counts is that there are few examples of economically significant innovations that have
not been patented (Dernis and Guellec, 2001; Dernis and Khan, 2004). Moreover, the analysis
on granted patents allows us, at least partly, to take into account the quality of the innovation
(e.g. novelty). A limitation of patent data is that are there are other means of protecting
innovations, such as industrial designs, trademarks and copyrights.9 Innovators may also prefer
9Unfortunately, register data on other intellectual property rights than patents are available only for a few
years in Norway (e.g. industrial designs since 2010 and copyrights since 2013).
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Figure 1: Yearly sum of patent applications and granted patents, by year of application.
Data source: The Norwegian Patent Office
secrecy over property rights to prevent the public disclosure of an innovation, or to save the
significant fees associated with filing patents (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2011). Nevertheless, it is
reasonable to assume that patent applications are strongly correlated with innovative activities
and that granted patents correspond to actual innovations (see e.g. the discussion in Bronzini
and Piselli, 2016). Moreover, patenting is widespread among R&D-active firms: One out of eight
firms that received R&D support in Norway during 2002-2013 have applied for patents, receiving
about a third of total R&D support (see Section 2.4).
We see from Figure 1 that the number of patent applications and granted patents increase
until 2007–2008, but with a downward trend thereafter. Part of this drop is likely due to the
financial crisis, but the number of patent applications and granted patents were still well below
their pre-crisis level in 2014. We also see that the annual numbers of granted patents (by year
of application) are roughly proportional to the number of applications.10
10Using data on granted patents involves potential timeliness problems because of the processing time of appli-
cations. However, to classify a patent application as granted we use processing data from the Norwegian Patent
Office as of January 2019, allowing for a four year lag from the latest time of application in the estimation sample
(December 2014) to the classification (January 2019).
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2.2 Innovation policy instruments
The Norwegian innovation policy instruments can be grouped into two main categories: i) tax
credits, which are rights-based subsidies, given that some formal requirements are fulfilled by
the applicant; and ii) direct subsidies. Direct subsidies aim to reflect the size of the external
spillovers from the research activities. The primary difference between these two innovation
policy instruments is that the former typically allows firms to choose projects, whereas the latter
is usually accompanied by a government directed project choice (David et al., 2000). As a result,
direct subsidies involve competition between projects and firms for government funding. The
two types of support are thus exposed to different types of selection biases. On the government
side there are several small agencies and two large ones: The Research Council of Norway and
Innovation Norway. This study only considers these two as the other agents are unimportant in
comparison (see Cappelen et al., 2016).
Traditionally, Norwegian R&D support have mainly been given as direct subsidies to firms
(Hægeland and Møen, 2007). The Research Council and Innovation Norway provide different
types of direct subsidies.11 The Research Council offers strategic and targeted subsidies for
research where at least 50 percent of the project is expected to be financed by the firm itself. 12
The Research Council also operates larger programs designed to build long-term knowledge
to encourage innovation, enhance value creation, as well as help find solutions to important
challenges facing society. Innovation Norway offers direct subsidies in the form of direct grants,
high-risk loans and guaranties. Both the Research Council13 and Innovation Norway14 offer direct
subsidies for priority thematic and technology areas, such as e.g. environmental technologies.
The R&D tax credit scheme Skattefunn (SKF) was introduced in January 2002 to SMEs15
but extended to all firms in the following year. It was believed that an R&D tax credit scheme
11The Research Council and Innovation Norway not only provide support intended to enhance innovation. The
policy assignments from the government to Innovation Norway can be specified in three separate categories: In
addition to innovation, Innovation Norway supports regional development and offer financial lending intended
to improve survival probabilities. We exclude support intended for the two latter objectives from our data in
order to identify the effects from subsidies aimed at innovation. In addition to innovation subsidies, the Research
Council provides support for e.g. project establishments and knowledge-building projects not directly related to
innovation, which we exclude from our data.
12Direct subsidies from Innovation Norway typically covers a larger percentage of the project cost. See the
home page of Innovation Norway (in Norwegian) for more details.
13http://www.forskningsradet.no/en/Research_areas/1252498540762
14http://www.innovasjonnorge.no/no/finansiering/miljoteknologi/
15Firms with a) less than 250 employees, and b) a yearly sales income not exceeding 50 million Euros or a
yearly profit not exceeding 43 million Euros (§16-40-5 Regulations for Law of Taxation)
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would provide more stable conditions for the business community than direct grants (see Cappe-
len et al., 2010). Firms are entitled to tax credits as long as the R&D project has been approved
by the Skattefunn division of the Research Council. The SKF scheme grants large firms 18 per-
cent and SMEs 20 percent of approved R&D expenses up to a cap. The cap was NOK 4 million
until 2008 and NOK 5.5 million from 2009-2013. Thus, the maximum tax refund for a large firm
in 2013 was about NOK 1 million (about EUR 110,000).16
Although low access to loans or private venture capital can hinder innovation, it is in prac-
tice difficult to identify firms that truly are exposed to such constraints. A common conception
is that innovation and economic growth is created by “entrepreneurial” small or medium sized
firms (SMEs). However, there is little empirical evidence to support this assertion. As Mazzu-
cato (2013) points out, the relationship between firm size and innovation is sensitive to various
factors such as industry or technology specific effects. Moreover, many small firms tend to be
young.
Based on the current design, the purpose of tax credits is not to reflect the size of the
external spillovers from the research. Unlike direct subsidies, the Norwegian tax credit scheme
does not discriminate between types of R&D projects or technologies. It is thus unlikely that
tax credits contribute in reducing the market failures and challenges that face the development
of particular types of technologies, as for example environmental technologies (Acemoglu et al.,
2012; Dechezleprêtre et al., 2013; Calel and Dechezleprêtre, 2016). Even if tax credits may make
marginal projects profitable, the firms may still focus on projects with the greatest short term
returns.17 Tax credits may therefore not promote new technologies that are not close to the
existing market solutions (David et al., 2000).
An important difference between direct subsidies and tax credits, is that tax credits are
obtained by many more firms, but in much smaller amounts per firm. For example, more than
60 percent of tax credits (SKF) are given in amounts of less than NOK 500,000 per firm-year.
The corresponding numbers for Innovation Norway (IN) and the Research Council (RCN) are
16The tax refund takes place at the end of the year when the actual R&D expenses were incurred. If the firm’s
taxes are less than the refund, the remaining tax credit is given as a direct grant. See Benedictow et al. (2018)
for more details abut the scheme.
17Assume that a firm has two potential projects, A and B, and apply for public funding of the "best" project,
say A. Furthermore, assume that it carries out both A and B if it gets funding and only A if not. Thus, even if
A is the supported project, B is the marginal project and the “impact“ of the support is that B is carried out .
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Figure 2: Distribution of support in NOK mil. from each policy instrument at the firm-year level
35 and 30 percent. On the other hand, a significant share of IN and RCN grants exceed NOK 6
million per year. This is illustrated in Figure 2.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the shares of received R&D support and filed
patent applications by (broad) industry classification, firm size (small, medium and large) and
region. We see that support is highly concentrated in a few industries, with about a third of
total support going to Professional, technical and scientific services (22 percent of tax credits and
41 percent of direct subsidies). Next comes Information and communication (with 25 percent of
tax credits and 12 percent of direct subsidies) and Manufacturing of Machinery and electronics
(14 percent of tax credits and 16 percent of direct subsidies). These three industries receive
65 percent of total support, but account for only 16 percent of the firm-years (a firm observed
for one year). In contrast, Other services account for 75 percent of the firm-years, but only
14 percent of total support. Patenting is highly concentrated in two industries: Professional,
technical and scientific services (34 percent) and Manufacturing of machinery and electronics
(27 percent). In comparison, Other services and other Manufacturing (excluding machinery and
electronics), account for 16 and 12.5 percent of the patent applications.
TABLE 1 HERE
Large firms (≥ 250 employees) make up less than 0.5 percent of the firm-years in the
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Business Register, receive 4 percent of the tax credits, 13 percent of the direct subsidies and hold
24 percent of the patent applications. Large firms thus patent more relative to the funding they
receive and – much more – relative to their numbers.18
Figure 3 depicts the share of treatment-years, defined as firm-years with tax credits or direct
subsidies, relative to all firm-years in the given industry (upper chart) or in the given employ-
ment category (lower chart). The industries with the highest share of treatment-years relative
to firm-years are Manufacturing of chemical, pharmaceutical, rubber and plastic products; Man-
ufacturing of machinery and electronics; Manufacturing of textiles and food; and Information
and communication. There is a strictly increasing relation between number of employees and
the receipt of R&D support (lower chart). Direct subsidies are disproportionally given to large
firms: Large firms have more than 10 percent probability of receiving direct subsidies and 8
percent probability of receiving tax credits in a given year, compared to 5 percent and 1 percent,
respectively, for firms with 10–49 employees.
2.3 Determinants of innovation
A number of firm characteristics may be important drivers of innovation – in addition to public
policies (see Klemetsen et al., 2018, for a systematic discussion). This is illustrated in Figure
4. The upper panel depicts the average number of patent applications vs. granted patents
per firm-year in each of the industries. Figure 4 also depicts the number of patents per firm-
year by number of employees (lower panel). The upper panel reveals large differences between
industries with regard to the propensity to patent. The three top industries in this respect
are Manufacturing of chemical, pharmaceutical, rubber and plastic products; Manufacturing of
machinery and electronics; and Mining, oil and gas extraction. Then comes Manufacturing of
metals and minerals and Professional, scientific and technical activities. Other industries have
an almost negligible number of patents per firm-year.
From the lower chart in Figure 4, there appears to be an exponential relation between firm
size and the propensity to patent. The number of patent applications per firm-year is 0.25 among
18The different regions in Norway account for a similar share of R&D support as of firm-years. The exception
is Middle Norway, which gets a disproportional share of directs subsidies (18 percent) compared to firm-years (8
percent). This is due to firms in the industry Research and Development (NACE 72), of which many participate
in research networks with the Norwegian Technical University located mainly in the city of Trondheim.
13
0
.
05
.
1
Tr
ea
tm
en
t-y
ea
rs
 a
s 
sh
ar
e 
of
 a
ll f
irm
-y
.
Prim
ary
 ind
.
Min
ing
, oi
l an
d g
as 
ext
r.
Tex
tile
s a
nd 
foo
d
Wo
od,
 pu
lp a
nd 
pap
er
Che
m.,
 ph
arm
a., 
rub
ber
, pl
ast
ic
Me
tals
, m
ine
rals
Ma
chi
ner
y a
nd 
ele
ctro
nics
Pow
er p
rod
., w
ast
e a
nd 
rec
ycli
ng
Info
rma
tion
 an
d c
om
mu
nic
atio
n
Pro
fes
sio
nal
, sc
ien
tific
 an
d te
chn
.
Oth
er s
erv
ices
Tax credits Direct subsidies
0
.
02
.
04
.
06
.
08
.
1
N
o.
 o
f t
re
at
m
en
t-y
ea
rs
 a
s 
sh
ar
e 
of
 a
ll f
irm
-y
.
< 5 empl 5-9 empl 10-49 empl 50-250 empl >250 empl
Tax credits Direct subsidies
Figure 3: Treatment-years according to source of funding (tax credits vs. direct subsidies) as share of
all firm-years, by industry (upper chart) and number of employees
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large firms, compared to only 0.03 among medium sized firms, and less than 0.01 among small
firms.
By taking into account both observed heterogeneity (control variables) and unobserved
heterogeneity (represented by fixed or random effects), we aim to eliminate the problem of
omitted variable bias when analyzing the effects of public R&D support. We will control for
R&D-activity, patenting history, firm size, age, industry and region. Some of these variables are
clearly endogenous and therefore would be "bad controls" in a regression model. Instead, we
apply a quasi-experimental design. That is, we mimic – through a stratification-based matching
procedure – the conditions of a randomized experiment as closely as possible by using the pre-
treatment values of the variables. The approach will be detailed in Section 3. The critical
prerequisite for our analyses is that our control group of firms is representative of the non-
treated (counterfactual) outcomes for the firms that receive support, i.e. the outcomes that
would have been realized if they had not received support.
2.4 Sample size and summary statistics before matching
Table 2 shows summary statistics for the Business Register, separating between "All firms"
and "Patenting firms". The upper part of the table shows that, in general, patenting firms
are much larger, more capital intensive and have higher labour productivity than non-patenting
firms. They are also somewhat older, with a mean firm-age of 12.5 vs. 10.5 years, but not more
profitable: the mean (median) return on assets is 2.1 (3.0) percent vs. 6.0 (4.1) percent for
patenting vs. all firms. The most striking difference is perhaps that among patenting firms, over
50 percent obtained R&D support, compared to just 3.7 percent among all firms.
Column 1 in the lower part of Table 2 shows that the Business Register consists of 335,763
firms, of which only 2,024 have at least one patent application during 2002-2013 (Column 3).
The number of treated firms, i.e. firms receiving R&D support, is 8,834. They received in total
NOK 21.9 bil. in R&D support between 2002 and 2013. Of the treated firms, 1,081 (i.e. 1 out
of 8) are patenting firms, receiving more than a third of the total R&D support in the Business
Register. Thus, R&D support is given highly disproportionate to patenting firms.
TABLE 2 HERE
15
0
.
02
.
04
.
06
N
um
be
r o
f p
at
en
ts
 p
er
 fi
rm
-y
.
Prim
ary
 ind
.
Min
ing
, oi
l an
d g
as 
ext
r.
Tex
tile
s a
nd 
foo
d
Wo
od,
 pu
lp a
nd 
pap
er
Che
mic
als,
 ph
arm
a., 
rub
ber
, pl
ast
ic
Me
tals
, m
ine
rals
Ma
chi
ner
y a
nd 
ele
ctro
nics
Pow
er p
rod
., w
ast
e a
nd 
rec
ycli
ng
Info
rma
tion
 an
d c
om
mu
nic
atio
n
Pro
fes
sio
nal
, sc
ien
tific
 an
d te
chn
ica
l ac
tivit
ies
Oth
er s
erv
ices
Patent applications Granted patents
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
.
2
.
25
N
um
be
r o
f p
at
en
ts
 p
er
 fi
rm
-y
.
< 5 empl 5-9 empl 10-49 empl 50-250 empl >250 empl
Patent applications Granted patents
Figure 4: Average number of patent application and granted patents per firm-year, by industry (upper
chart) and number of employees
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Table 3 contains descriptive statistics for treated firms after the merger of the Business
Register with our two sources of R&D survey data. Comparing Column 1 and 2 in the upper
part of Table 3, we see that the need to classify firms as either R&D-active or R&D-inactive at
the time of treatment assignment reduces the sample size by less than 15 percent. The number
of treatment-years is reduced from 27,224 to 23,737 and the amount of R&D support from NOK
21.9 bil. to NOK 19.1 bil.
In the lower part of Table 3 (Column 3), we see that about 70 percent of treated firms were
R&D-active before receiving treatment. Perhaps even more strikingly, R&D support is given
disproportionate to young firms. The lower part of Table 3 (Column 1) shows that 43 percent
of the treated firms were 3 years or younger when first assigned to treatment. In comparison, 30
percent of all firm-years in the Business Register are related to firms aged 3 years or less (see
upper part of Table 2). These figures reflect that the R&D support schemes are generally more
popular among start-up than incumbent firms, but also that IN and RCN have programs that
target young firms.19
The shares of patenting firms before and after the merging of the Business Register with
the two sources of R&D survey data are almost identical: 11 and 12 percent (Column 1 and 3 in
the lower part of Table 3). Moreover, comparing Column 1 (Column 2) with Column 3 (Column
4), respectively, we see that the mean (median) number of employees among the treated firms is
32.1 (5.0) in the Business Register vs. 39.7 (7.0) in the merged data set. The firms in the two
data sets have almost identical characteristics for all other variables: the mean (median) firm-age
is 8.6 (5.0) vs. 9.0 (5.0), the mean (median) return on assets (RoA) is 1.0 (2.0) percent vs. 2.0
(3.0) percent, and the mean (median) level of labour productivity is 0.45 (0.40) vs. 0.46 (0.41).
TABLE 3 HERE
2.5 The matched estimation sample
Our matching is based on stratification: treated firms are matched with non-treated firms be-
longing to the same stratum at the time of matching. The matching (stratification) variables
(X) are: NACE industry (at the 2-digit level), region, firm-age, employment, R&D expenditure
19An example is "Etablererstøtte" (start-up support) from IN.
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and (lags of) number of patent applications. The matching variables should affect both the
dependent variable and the probability of treatment. That this is the case with regard to X
is evident from the discussions and the descriptive statistics presented above. We divide the
possible outcomes of the matching vector X into strata, x, as follows:
x = (ind, reg, age, empl, rd, pat)
where ind is a 2-digit NACE industry, reg denotes a region (see Table 1), age is an age interval (0–
3, 4–9, or >9 years), empl is an employment interval (<5, 5-19, 20-49, 50-249, ≥250 employees),
and rd is R&D-status : a dummy for whether the firm had positive R&D expenditures (including
R&D support) during the three preceding years not including the current one. Finally, pat is a
dummy for whether the firm has had at least one patent application since 1995.
The final estimation sample is a combination of sampling from the R&D census and
the Business Register, as treated R&D-active firms (firms with positive R&D expenditure) are
matched with non-treated R&D-active firms according to the R&D census. On the other hand,
R&D-inactive firms (according to R&D expenditure reported in the R&D census or in the sup-
plementary R&D questionnaire) are matched with firms from the Business Register with no
recorded R&D activity.
Table 4 shows that the final matched sample consists of 13,528 (3,406+10,122) treatment-
years, comprising NOK 11 bil. in total R&D support, of which 70 percent was received by firms
that were R&D-active at the time of treatment assignment. Moreover, 4.5 (2.6) percent of the
R&D-active (R&D-inactive) firms were classified as patenting firms prior to treatment. The
total number of patents by firms included in the estimation sample is 3,148. Of these, 2,441
(328+2,113) are related to treated firms.
TABLE 4 HERE
The effect of the matching is a substantial reduction of the estimation sample: the final
estimation sample described in Table 4 comprises 3,622 (1,134+2,528) treated firms, compared
to 6,838 treated firms with R&D information in the Business Register (Table 3). This reduction
in sample size is the price we pay for a matched estimation sample with excellent balancing
properties. First, by construction, the matching is exact with regard to the categorical variables
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R&D-activity (rd), prior patenting (pat), industry (ind) and region (reg). Second, from the
upper part of Table 4, we see that the matched estimation sample is almost perfectly balanced
with regard to the mean of employment and firm-age. That is, we do not reject that the means
are equal for the treated and controls (this is easily derived from the reported standard errors
(SE) in Table 4).20 Third, we observe good balancing properties in Table 4 also with regard to
variables not used in the stratification, such as labour productivity, capital intensity and return
to assets. The explanation is that neither of these variables are significant predictors of treatment
conditional on the matching variables. In contrast, the matching variables are highly significant
predictors of treatment.21
3 Empirical model
As already stated, our main research question is whether the two main types of innovation
policies – tax credits and direct subsidies – spur innovations in the form of patenting. However,
a firm receiving a large amount of support can have a higher propensity for patenting cet. par.
We will control for this selection problem by means of statistical matching, as discussed above.
Furthermore, we will allow for heterogeneity in treatment effects across firms and programs. In
this way, we can relate the estimated effects to the characteristics of firms and policies, such as
the amount and source of support, when interpreting the results (see Section 4).
To take into account that R&D support tend to take the form of annual payments and/or
tax deductions in consecutive years, reflecting the duration of the supported projects, we define
a treatment as a sequence of consecutive firm-years with support. We will refer to the first year
in the sequence as the year of treatment assignment, denoted Ti (the firm receives support in
Ti but not in Ti − 1 ). The number of consecutive years with support is denoted Di (the firm
receives support in Ti, Ti + 1, ..., Ti + Di − 1, but not in Ti + Di). In the case of non-consecutive
years with support, we will consider this as repeated treatments, with a separate matching for
20When the reported mean values are used with the standard errors to calculate 95 percent (pairwise) confidence
intervals for treated and controls, it is easily seen that they overlap. Formal tests of equality of both means and
medians are available from the authors upon request. In all cases these tests lead to a clear non-rejection.
21Comparing Table 1 (before matching) and Table A.1 in the Appendix (after matching), give further evidence
that the matched estimation sample is representative for the population of treated firms as a whole, including the
industry and regional distributions. Thus, while the matching substantially reduces the sample of treated firms
that can be analysed, the matched sample is not skewed with regard to any dimension of x, such as e.g. firm size
or firm age.
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each treatment (see below, especially Footnote 24).
To identify separate effects of treatments funded by different policy instruments, we must
take into account that co-funding is widespread. For this purpose, we define the main policy
instrument as the source of the largest amount of support at the treatment level by summing
the NOK support from all sources over the treatment period. Although research projects may
receive public funding from several sources, there tends to be one dominant source of funding
(we will address the robustness of our results to the definition of the policy instrument in Section
4.3).
In our empirical model, the dependent variable, Pit, is a count variable denoting either
the number of granted patents or patent applications of firm i in year t. Let Pit(d) denote the
outcome of the dependent variable as a function of treatment status, where d = 0 means non-
treatment and d ∈ {1, 2, ...} means treatment with duration d (d consecutive years of support).
Note the important difference between Pit(Di) and Pit(d): Pit(Di) is the realized outcome, while
Pit(d), for d ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...}, are the potential outcomes. In particular, we will refer to Pit(0) as
the non-treated outcome.
Let S(X) = x be the mapping that maps the matching vector X into a unique stratum x,
as explained in Section 2.5. We assume that, conditional on x, the causal effect of the treatment
is represented by a fixed or random effect, τi . That is, the conditional mean of the potential
outcome Pit(d) is given by:
E(Pit(d)|S(XiTi ) = x, τi, Di) = exp(τi1(1 ≤ s ≤ d))
× E(Pit(0)|S(XiTi ) = x) (1)
where s ≥ 0 is the number of years since treatment assignment (Ti), t = Ti + s and 1(A) is the
indicator function which is one if the statement A is true and zero otherwise. The key identifying
assumption in Equation (1), is that the stratification S(X) is sufficiently rich so that conditional
mean independence (CMI) holds with regard to the non-treated outcome. That is:
E(Pit(0)|S(XiTi) = x, τi, Di) = E(Pit(0)|S(XiT i) = x) for t ≥ Ti (2)
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The specification consisting of Equations (1)-(2) is a multiplicative version of the (linear) matched
Diff-in-diff model advocated by e.g. Blundell and Costa Dias (2009), where treatment-specific
effects (τi) are also considered as fixed or random. As in the linear model, CMI means that
whatever treatment, Di, the firm is assigned to at Ti , this assignment is per se uninformative
about the expected non-treated outcome of the dependent variable (given x).
3.1 Common trend
The expected non-treated outcome is assumed to be determined by a common trend – denoted
mt(x, Ti) – depending on what stratum, x, the firm belongs to at the time of treatment assign-
ment, Ti:
E(Pit(0)|S(XiTi) = x) = exp(mt(x, Ti)) (3)
Importantly, mt(x, Ti) only depends on predetermined values and therefore is not affected by
the treatment.
If we were to estimate the above model on a given reference population, e.g. as a count data
regression model with Pit(Di) as the dependent variable, the causal effects would be identified
solely by the functional form of mt(∙). Since Di and XiTi , by assumption, are highly correlated,
any error in the specification of the common trend could turn up as a spurious "treatment effect".
Moreover, for non-treated firms (Di = 0), Ti is not well-defined: it is a potential year of treatment
assignment.
To address these issues, we combine stratification and statistical matching as follows. First,
we define the cell C(x, T ) as the set of all firms observed to belong to the strata x at T . The
subset of firms in this cell that are assigned to treatment at T (i.e. firms with Ti = T ) is denoted
NT (x).22 The corresponding control group, MT (x), is a subset of non-treated firms in C(x, T ).23
The main identifying restriction with regard to the estimation is that the firms in the control
group, MT (x), have the same common trend, mt(x, T), as the firms in the treatment group,
22Formally NT (x) = {i : S(XiT ) = x, Ti = T, Di > 0} and C(x, T ) = {i : S(XiT ) = x}
23In principle, any non-treated firm in C(x, T ) could be in the control group. Some details are in order here:
First, all firms in the cell that are assigned to treatment at T will have the same control group (many-to-many
matching). Second, any non-treated firm could potentially belong to several control groups (one for each T ). To
achieve uniqueness and efficiency, a firm is assigned to a (unique) control group according to a simple rule which
attempts to balance the ratio of number of treated to controls across the cells. Third, we do not exclude firms
from potentially being in a control group until they get treatment (if any), since such exclusions would depend
on future outcomes of endogenous variables (e.g. future R&D) and thus violate CMI.
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NT (x).
3.2 Treatment response function
Since pinpointing the timing of the effects from the policies are challenging and little guidance
is available from the literature, we model the effect of the treatment as simple as possible: A
treatment assigned at Ti induces – with a one-year lag – a proportional shift in the expected
number of patents equal to exp(τi) during the treatment. Of course, different lag choices can
easily be accommodated. In the empirical section we will also investigate "long term" or "post-
treatment" effects.
As we cannot estimate a separate parameter τi for each treatment, further assumptions
must be made. Moreover, to identify separate effects of the different policy instruments, we must
take into account the source of funding. Our approach is to relate τi to observed variables, both
with respect to firm characteristics (x) and the source of funding.
Formally, let the dummy variables TCi and DSi be one if the main policy instrument is,
respectively, tax credits and direct subsidies. Furthermore, let Pi = (TCi, DSi) and assume:
E(exp(τi)|S(XiT) = x,Di, Pi ) = exp(π(x)TC + γ(x)DSi)
≡ exp(τ(x, Pi)) (4)
We will henceforth refer to τ(x, Pi) as the treatment response function. The treatment response
function expresses the relative increase in the expected number of patent applications from the
policy Pi: τ(x, Pi) is equal to π(x) or γ(x) – depending on whether TCi = 1 or DSi = 1.
Although the treatment response, in principle, is allowed to depend on firm characteristics (x)
in a non-restricted way, we mostly focus on the impact of pre-treatment R&D-status (rd) and
patenting (pat) in our empirical analyses (see Section 4). The potential impact of firm-size and
firm-age will also be investigated. Moreover, we will examine the impact of policy mixtures, i.e.
co-funding of the same treatment from multiple funding agencies.
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3.3 Estimation
Pit = Pit(Di) is the dependent variable. To estimate the treatment response function, τ(x, p),
we utilize that in the matched sample the following holds:24
E(Pit|S(XiT ) = x,Di, Pi) = exp(τ(x, Pi)1(1 ≤ s ≤ Di) + mt(x, T )) i ∈ NT (x)
E(Pjt|S(XjT ) = x) = exp(mt(x, T )) j ∈ MT (x)
(5)
where s ≥ 0 is the number of years since the start of treatment and t = T + s. The notation
mt(x, T ) underscores that the common trend is specific to the cell, i.e. it is non-parametrically
identified as cell-specific time-effects. Hence, we specify mt(x, T ) as a fixed year-effect (specific
to t) plus a cell-specific random year-effect (specific to (t, x)). The assumption of random cell-
specific year-effects is justified since XiT and Di are independent in the matched sample.25
In view of the discussion in Section 2, a key assumption is that mt(x, T ) does not depend
on variables that may be affected by the treatment, such as contemporaneous R&D activity or
employment. Current endogenous variables are "bad controls". Therefore, the control variables
are used only for stratification (matching), but not included as explanatory variables in the
regressions.26
It is not possible to identify causal effects in this model if fixed firm effects are also included.
The reason is that the firm is observed from the start of treatment (s = 0) until the end of
treatment (s = Di) – or possibly a few years more. An implication is that a fixed firm-dummy
will be (almost) perfectly correlated with the treatment indicator 1(1 ≤ s ≤ Di). Our identifying
assumption is that the firms in the control group represent the non-treated outcomes of the
treated firm, not – as in a fixed effects model – that the treated firms patent more just after (or
24A firm (i) that obtained treatment at Ti = T is 1) considered as a treated firm from T and onwards (but
not earlier); 2) it remains in the sample after treatment until it exits; 3) if a firm receives repeated treatments
(non-consequtive firm-years with support), each new treatment is accompanied by a separate matching; 4) if an
R&D-inactive firm obtains R&D support a second time, it will change status from R&D-inactive to R&D-active
for the second matching.
25Even if the stratification may achieve independence of XiT and Di within each cell (T is the year of matching),
this does not guarantee a balanced distribution of XiT in the matched estimation sample. The reason is that
the ratio of treated to controls varies across the cells. Based on the theory of unequal probability sampling (see
Särndal et al., 1992), we correct this imbalance by means of weights, wi, where wi = 1 if i ∈ NT (x) (treated) and
wj = M(#N
T (x))/(N#MT (x)) if j ∈ MT (x) (controls), where #A denotes number of elements in the set A,
and N and M denote the total number of treated and controls across all the cells in the matched sample. Then∑
j∈MT (x) wj/#N
T (x) = M/N , i.e. the number of weighted controls per treated firm is equal to M/N in each
cell. As a result, a balanced distribution of XiT is achieved in the weighted matched sample.
26Our approach is in line with Lechner (2010) and Lechner and Wunsch (2013). Like us, they do not include
control variables in the regression (Diff-in-diff) part of the estimation, only in the matching part.
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during) treatment than it did before treatment.
We estimate our model using the mixed Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood estimator, i.e.
with both fixed and random coefficients.27 If the expected number of patents is correctly specified,
this estimator yields a consistent quasi-maximum likelihood estimator of τ(x, p) even if the
assumption of a Poisson-distribution does not hold (see Gourieroux and Monfort, 1995, Ch.
8.4).28 Robust estimates of the covariance matrix of the quasi-maximum likelihood estimator
are easily available (see Cameron and Trivedi, 2015). We will also estimate a fixed effects Poisson
model as a benchmark in Section 4.
4 Results
The estimates of the parameters in Equations (4)-(5) are presented in Table 5 for patent appli-
cations and Table 6 for granted patents. The corresponding estimates of marginal effects (ME)
are presented in Table 7. We report estimates along two dimensions with regard to firm charac-
teristics (x): (1) R&D-active vs. R&D-inactive firms (rd) and (2) patenting vs. non-patenting
firms (pat), where both variables are measured at the year of treatment assignment (the year of
matching). Other dimensions of x (firm-size and firm-age) will be considered in Table 8.
4.1 Estimates of the treatment response function (relative effects)
Table 5 contains the results of the relative effects of innovation policies on the number of patent
applications, i.e. the estimates of the treatment response function. The main policy instrument
is indicated in the first column of the tables, while the second and third columns classify the
treated firm according to the pre-treatment value of (rd, pat). In addition to the matching
estimator explained in Section 3, we report estimates of a fixed effects benchmark model (FE).
The FE model includes fixed firm-effects and calendar-year dummies in addition to the treatment
variables.
TABLE 5 HERE
27We use the STATA command mepoisson with weights, where the fixed part includes the calendar year
dummies, the weights wi are defined in Footnote 25, and the mixing (random coefficients) is with regard to the
cell-specific year-effects.
28This is not the case with the popular Negative binomial distribution unless unwarranted restrictions are placed
on the overdispersion parameter (see Guimaraes, 2008; and Cameron and Trivedi, 2015)
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The fixed effects (FE) specification captures correlation between unobserved firm specific ef-
fects and the treatment variables (the right-hand side variables). This feature of the model comes
at the cost of throwing out from the analysis firms without patents, as time-invariant variables
are automatically dropped from the FE model.29 As a result, the FE model is more appropriate
for investigating the intensity of innovation (intensive margin) rather than the propensity to
innovate (extensive margin). Nevertheless, we cannot consider the FE estimates as representing
causal effects. The reason is that the identification of causal effects in the FE model depends on
the implausible assumption that selection into treatment is time-invariant at the firm level.
From the lower part of Table 5 we see that the number of treated firms and patent applica-
tions included in the FE estimation are, respectively, 664 and 3,193. The corresponding numbers
for the matching estimator are 3,362 and 2,724. Thus, the sample for the matching estimator is
much larger with respect to number of treated firms, and moderately smaller with regard to the
number of patent applications.
From the results of the matching estimator in Table 5, it appears that both tax credits
and direct subsidies have significant positive effects on the prevalence of patent applications.
However, the effects seem to be highly dependent on the pre-treatment classification of the firm.
All the significant results refer to the extensive margin ; firms with no patent applications prior
to treatment. Furthermore, it is noticeable that that the magnitude of the estimates are higher
in the case of R&D-inactive firms compared to R&D-active firms. We also see that the estimates
for direct subsidies are significantly higher than for tax credits.
Comparing the estimates from the matched sample and the FE model in Table 5, we see that
the same parameters are significant in both models. As explained in Section 3.2, these parameters
can be interpreted in terms of relative effects, i.e. relative to the non-treated outcome. However,
since the expected number of patents is likely to be much higher in the FE sample because it
only includes patenting firms, the magnitude of the effects are not comparable across the two
models. We will return to the more interesting Average Marginal (level) Effect (AME) estimates
in Table 7, i.e. the effects of the treatment on the number of patents.
We replicate the results of Table 5 using granted patents instead of applications in Table
29To retain a sample which is as large as possible, we estimate the FE model over the extended time period
1995-2014.
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6. Further evidence of our main findings from Table 5 are given in Table 6. All the parameter
estimates are strikingly similar in the two tables. Moreover, the significant results are related to
the extensive margins and are much stronger for direct subsidies than for tax credits.
TABLE 6 HERE
4.2 Average Marginal Effect (AME)
The marginal effect of the treatment is defined as the change in the expected number of patents,
given the pre-treatment classification of the firm (x) and the main policy instrument (P ). The
estimated average marginal effects (AMEs) for patent applications and granted patents are re-
ported in the upper part of Table 7. They are derived from the corresponding parameter estimates
from the matching estimator reported in Table 5 and 6.
The level of significance reported in Table 5 (for patent applications) and Table 6 (for
granted patents) are translated into very similar levels of significance in Table 7. There are
no significant estimates of AMEs at the intensive margin, whereas all estimated AMEs at the
extensive margin (firms with no patent applications prior to treatment) are significant at the 1
or 5 percent level. These main findings of Table 7 hold with regard to patent applications as well
as granted patents.
Some other notable results from the upper part of Table 7 are the following: 1) The
expected number of patent applications or granted patents per year (μ) is close to the estimated
AMEs in the case of firms without prior patenting, indicating that their non-treated probability
of patenting is close to zero. 2) The estimated AMEs for granted patents are equal to, or slightly
below, those for patent applications, but not significantly different. 3) The AME estimates in
Table 7 for R&D-inactive firms (prior to treatment) are much higher for direct subsidies (in the
range 0.13–0.15) compared to tax credits (about 0.01). 4) In the case of R&D-inactive firms,
the estimated AMEs for direct subsidies are much higher than for tax credits also relative to the
amount of support received. For example, while the mean (median) support intensity (support
per year during treatment) is three (two) times higher for direct subsidies than for tax credits
(see the lower part of Table 7), the estimated AMEs are higher by a factor exceeding 10.
In the the lower part of Table 7, we present estimates of sums of marginal effects (Sum
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ME), defined as the sum of all the AMEs across all treatment-years. We can interpret Sum ME
as the total number of patents triggered by tax credits or direct grants occurring in the data
period. Regarding patent applications, the estimated Sum ME for direct subsidies and tax credits
are 239 and 139, respectively. The corresponding estimates are 157 and 56 for granted patents.
As seen from the lower part of Table 4, the amount of direct subsides and tax credits in the
estimation sample are equal: 2.1 + 3.4 = 5.5 (direct subsidies) and 1.2 + 4.3 = 5.5 (tax credits).
We conclude that direct subsides have been much more effective in triggering innovations as
measured by patent applications and granted patents than tax credits.
TABLE 7 HERE
While previous patenting and R&D activity are clearly the most important predictors of
future patenting, the treatment response function may depend on other pre-treatment charac-
teristics (x). In particular, the descriptive statistics reported in Section 2 indicate that firm-size
is a key determinant of patenting (cf. Figure 4). Moreover, we have seen that a disproportionate
share (43 percent) of treated firms are 3 years or younger when first assigned to treatment (cf.
Table 3). Hence, it is potentially interesting to separate between start-up firms (≤ 3 years) and
incumbent firms (> 3 years) when reporting AME estimates.
In Table 8, the estimated AMEs are allowed to depend on an additional dimension Firm
Type. In the upper part of Table 8, Firm Type refers to start-up or incumbent firm.
TABLE 8 HERE
From the results in the upper part of Table 8 (both granted and applications), we see that –
conditional on (pat, rd) – the estimated AME are very similar for start-ups and incumbent firms.
Not only are the estimates of the same magnitude and have overlapping confidence intervals, but
in each case where the AME estimate is significant in Table 7, the corresponding pair of AME
estimates in Table 8 (one for each Firm Type) are also significant.
The lower part of Table 8 displays estimated AME when Firm Type refers to firm-size
(large firms vs. SMEs) – instead of firm-age. As in Table 1, a large firm is defined as having 250
or more employees. There are three main takings from the lower part of Table 8. First, among
the R&D-inactive firms, there are too few large firms to even estimate AMEs. Second, among the
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R&D-active firms with no prior patenting, the estimated AMEs are significant only for SMEs.
Nevertheless, the estimates are almost identical for SMEs and large firms. Finally, there is weak
evidence (significant at the 10 percent level) that large R&D-active firms with prior patenting
have a positive AME from direct subsidies (but not from tax credits).
4.3 Robustness issues: Long-term effects and support mixture
To examine long-term effects, Table 9 presents AME estimates for the post-treatment period,
defined as the period from Ti + Di +1 (two years after the end of the treatment; see Section 3)
until Ti + 2Di. For comparability with Table 7 and 8, the post-treatment period is defined as
having the same duration (= Di) as the treatment period.30
TABLE 9 HERE
PTAME in Table 9 expresses the average marginal effect of treatment during the post-treatment
period. Similar to AME, it represents an average effect per year during this period. None of the
estimates in Table 9 are even close to being significant: the highest (absolute) z-value is 1.2. These
findings unambiguously support the hypothesis that the effects of R&D support are materialized
within one year after the end of treatment. They are also consistent with results obtained by
Lanjouw and Mody (1996) and Griliches (1998), who observe that patent applications tend to
be taken out early in the life of a research project.
So far, we have classified the source of funding of public support by the main policy in-
strument, i.e. whether the largest source of funding is direct subsidies or tax credits. However,
one might think that approval from multiple public agencies may signal a high quality of the
project. The existing literature provides little evidence on this issue. For example, Bérubé and
Mohnen (2009) find that firms which receive direct R&D subsidies in addition to R&D tax cred-
its are more innovative than firms which only receive tax credits. In contrast, Czarnitzki and
Lopes-Bento (2013) find that the estimated treatment effects do not depend on dummy variables
related to the presence of a subsidy mix.
Similar to Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2013), we examine the issue of support mixture
by means of (ad hoc) dummy variables. Specifically, we introduce one dummy variable taking
30If a firm is assigned to a new treatment or is no longer observed (firm-exit), the post-treatment period is
truncated accordingly (cf. Footnote 24).
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the value one if two public agencies provide support for the same treatment and another dummy
variable which is one if the project is supported by all three sources (IN, RCN and SKF). We
include a full set of interactions between these two dummy variables and the dummy variables
indicating the main policy instrument. The result of the estimation is that we do not reject our
original specification. The p-value of the test is approximately 0.6, which is clearly insignificant.
This result is likely to reflect that treatments with SKF as main policy instrument rarely include
funding from IN or RCN, whereas treatments with direct subsidies as main policy instrument,
often include tax credits as a secondary source of funding. This is illustrated in Table 10. In the
upper part of the table, we see that in the case of treatments with direct subsidies (DIR) as the
main policy instrument (main source of funding), support from SKF is received in 42 percent
of the corresponding treatment-years. In the case of treatments with SKF as the main policy
instrument, support from DIR is received in only 8 percent of the corresponding treatment-years.
Looking at the amount of support reveals a striking difference between the policy instru-
ments (lower part of Table 10): In the case of treatments with direct subsidies (DIR) as the main
policy instrument, 74 percent of total funding comes from DIR. In the case of treatments with
SKF as the main policy instrument, 85 percent of total funding comes from SKF. The conclusion
from Table 10 is that projects mainly supported by direct subsides often obtain tax credits too,
but not vice versa.
TABLE 10 HERE
5 Conclusions and policy implications
We have analysed the three major sources of direct and indirect R&D subsidies in Norway:
direct subsidies from Innovation Norway and the Research Council of Norway, and the R&D
tax credit scheme Skattefunn. Our analyses are based on a quasi-experimental design, where we
mimic – through a stratification-based matching procedure – the conditions of a randomized ex-
periment, using measures of pre-treatment R&D activity, patenting, firm-size, firm-age, industry
and region as stratification variables.
Innovation policies to support private R&D activities should ideally reflect the size of the
external spillovers from the research. Direct grants from the Research Council and Innovation
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Norway are targeted specifically towards projects with low private return and possibly high social
return, such as e.g. the development of environmental and medical technologies. Targeting R&D
subsidies specifically towards prioritized technology areas that generate larger externalities is
thus likely necessary in order to foster major innovation leaps and new technologies that are not
already close to the existing market solution.
In contrast to direct grants, tax credits are generally thought to give more incentives to
SMEs – as they are typically more exposed to financial constraints than large firms – and to
firms with little R&D activity before obtaining support – due to a cap on the tax deductions.
In our empirical analyses, we found that both direct subsidies and tax credits have signifi-
cant positive effects on patent applications as well as granted patents. However, the magnitude
of the effects depend critically on the firms’ pre-treatment characteristics. All our statistically
significant estimates (at the 5 percent level) are related to the extensive margin, i.e. firms with no
patent applications prior to obtaining support. We find little or no evidence that other variables,
such as firm-size or firm-age, have a separate impact on the efficiency of the support when we
control for the pre-treatment level of R&D activity and patenting.
We find that direct subsidies have triggered at least three times as many granted patents per
NOKmillion of support compared to tax credits. The entire effect pertains to firms that are R&D-
inactive prior to obtaining support. Therefore, the usual explanation, that tax credits provide
less incentives for innovation than direct subsidies for R&D active firms, especially large ones,
does not apply here. Rather, our results indicate that projects that are (mainly) supported by
direct subsidies have a higher potential for innovation than projects that are (mainly) subsidized
by tax credits.
Our analyses lead to rather strong policy implications. Support to historically innovating
firms do not spur further innovations, at least not patentable ones. The reason may be that
the supported projects are carried out regardless of the support (cf. Footnote 17). Instead,
support should be directed to promote innovations at the extensive margin, i.e. to firms with a
high potential of becoming innovative rather than to firms that already have a record of being
innovative. Moreover, as targeted subsidies generate more innovations, society benefits from
distributing much of the subsidies to priority areas.
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TABLES 
 
 
 
Table 1. Share of R&D support, patent applications and firm-years. In percent, by 
industry region and firm-size   
Classification variable Direct 
support 
Tax credits Patent 
appl. 
Firm-
years 
 
      
Industry      
Primary industries 2.9 3.8 0.4 1.6  
Mining, oil and gas extraction 1.3 1.0 5.0 0.5  
Manufacturing 29.0 31.9 39.7 6.1  
  -Textiles and food 3.7 4.9 1.7 1.2  
  -Wood, pulp and paper 1.1 1.7 0.9 1.1  
  -Chemicals, pharma., rubber, plastic 5.0 4.1 6.5 0.4  
  -Metals, minerals 4.9 5.2 3.4 1.2  
  -Machinery and electronics 14.3 16.0 27.2 2.2  
Power prod., waste and recycling 1.6 1.6 1.1 0.9  
Information and communication 11.9 25.2 3.8 4.2  
Professional, scientific and technical 
services 
41.0 21.7 34.3 10.8  
Other services 12.3 14.9 15.8 75.9  
      
Region      
South 5.3 5.1 6.6 6.0  
East 43.8 49.4 48.3 52.5  
West 27.2 28.1 34.0 25.8  
Middle 18.2 11.1 8.6 7.6  
North 5.6 6.4 2.5 8.2  
 
Firm-size 
     
Small (<50 employees) 64.2 82.5 63.0 98.1  
Medium (50-249 employees) 22.6 13.9 13.5 1.6  
Large (250 employees) 13.2 3.6 23.5 0.3  
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Table 2. Mean/median of key variables at the firm-year level (upper part) and summary 
statistics (lower part). All vs. patenting firms in the Business Register, 2002-2013  
Variables All firms Patenting firms1 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
No. of patent applications 0.002  0.24  
No. of granted patents 0.002  0.18  
Treated firm (0/1)2 0.037  0.57  
No. of employees 7.4 1 85.8 5 
Labor productivity3 0.43 0.36 0.56 0.51 
Return on assets4 0.060 0.041 0.021 0.030 
Capital intensity5 1.40 0.58 2.39 1.39 
Firm-age 10.5 7 12.5 9 
Firm-age 3   (0/1)6 0.30  0.22  
No of firm-years 2,088,033  17,370  
No of firms 335,763  2,024  
No of treated firms 8,834  1,081  
Total support (NOK billion) 21.9  7.5  
No. of patent appl. 4,230  4,230  
No. patent appl. by treated firms 2,969  2,969  
No. of granted patents 3,226  3,226  
No. of granted patents by treated firms  1,744  1,744  
     
Notes: 0/1 indicates a firm-year dummy variable. 1 Firms with at least one patent application during the period.  
2Equal to 1 in all years if the firm received support at least once. 3 Value added per employee in NOK million 
(NOK 100   EUR 11 during 2002-2013). 4Operating income divided by the book value of total assets. 
5Tangible fixed assets in NOK million per employee. 6 Equal to 1 if the firm is   3 years old  
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Table 3. Treated firms in the Business Register: total R&D support and 
descriptive statistics at the time of treatment assignment 
 
All treated  firms  
Treated firms with 
R&D info1 
No. of treated firms 8,834   6,838  
No. of treatment-years 2) 27,224   23,737  
Firm-years with IN support 4,362   3,141  
Firm-years with RCN support 3,646   3,172  
Firm-years with SKF support 23,049   21,053  
Total support (NOK billion) 21.9   19.1  
Total IN support 5.0   4.1  
Total RCN support 6.4   5.0  
Total SKF support 10.5   9.9  
No. of patent applications 2,969   2,017  
Descriptive stat. (treated firms)3 Mean Median  Mean Median 
Previous patent appl. (0/1) 4 0.11 0  0.12 0 
No. of employees  32.1 5.0  39.7 7.0 
Labor productivity 5 0.45 0.40  0.46 0.41 
Return on assets6 0.010 0.020  0.020 0.030 
Firm age 8.6 5.0  9.0 5.0 
Firm age ≤ 3 (0/1) 4 0.43 0.00  0.43 0.00 
Capital intensity7 1.63 0.83  1.61 0.83 
R&D-active (0/1) 4 NA NA  0.70 1.0 
 
Notes: The table reports summary statistics for key variables at firm-year level for all treated firms in the 
Business Register vs. firms in the Business Register merged with R&D data. The lower part of the table gives the 
mean/median values of key variables at the firm-year level at the time of treatment assignment. 1 From two 
sources: the annual R&D census and questionnaires to firms with support from SKF 2 Some firms might receive 
support from several sources. Thus, the total for the rows might be larger than the no. of treatment-years. 3At the 
time of treatment assignment 4 Dummy variable. 5Value added per employee in millions of NOK (100 NOK   11 
EUR). 6Operating income divided by the book value of total assets. 7Tangible fixed assets in NOK million per 
employee 
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Table 4. Balancing properties w.r.t. key variables in the estimation sample at the time of 
matching. Treated vs. controls and R&D-inactive vs. R&D-active firms 1   
Variables R&D-inactive   R&D-active   
 Treated Control Treated  Control 
 Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE 
Patent appl. before matching (0/1)2 0.026 0.004 0.026 0.008 0.045 0.008 0.045 0.008 
No. of employees 21.2 2.9 21.4 2.0 39.1 8.1 33.3 5.4 
Labor productivity3 483 16 448 13 490 40 504 30 
Return on assets4 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.01 
Capital intensity5 1454 145 1484 38 1762 109 1857 179 
Firm-age 9.9 0.3 8.9 0.7 10.6 0.5 9.6 0.5 
Firm-age 3   (0/1)6 0.42 0.02 0.46 0.04 0.27 0.02 0.35 0.02 
Small firm (0/1)7 0.89 0.01 0.91 0.01 0.87 0.03 0.87 0.03 
Medium firm (0/1)8 0.09 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.11 0.02 
R&D support and sample size 2002-
2013: 
        
No. of firms 1,134  68,930  2,528  2,970 
No. of treatment-years 3,406    10,122    
No. of firm-years with DIR subsidies  1,117    2,276    
No. of firm-years with SKF credits 2,747    9,203    
Total support (NOK billion) 3.3    7.7    
Total DIR subsidies 2.1    3.4    
Total SKF credits 1.2    4.3    
No. of patent appl. 2002-2013 328  283  2,113  424  
 
Notes: 0/1 indicates a firm-year dummy variable. 1 Frequency weighted averages of cell-specific means at the time 
of matching, with weights equal to no. of treated firms in each cell. 2 Equal to 1 if the firm has at least one patent 
application prior to treatment assignment; the patent variables date back to 1995. 3Value added per employee in 
NOK million (100 NOK  11 EUR). 4Operating income divided by the book value of total assets. 5Tangible fixed 
assets in million NOK per employee. 6Equal to 1 if the firm is   3 years old. 7Equal to 1 if the firm has <50 
employees. 8Equal to 1 if 50 employees 250   
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Table 5. Effects of innovation policies on patent applications. Estimates of the treatment 
response functions ( )x  and ( )x  using the matching and fixed effects (FE) estimator, by 
main policy instrument and firm classification 
Policy Firm classification (x) 
Matching estimator 
   
FE estimator1 
 Prior Prior Est.   z-value     Est.   z-value 
 patents R&D         
Direct subsidies No2 Inactive
3 6.2 *** 13.3   1.14 ** 2.38 
 No Active
 1.4 *** 5.6   1.16 *** 3.11 
 Yes Active 1.4  1.7   -0.11  -0.84 
Tax credits No Inactive
 3.7 *** 8.0   0.97 ** 2.14 
 No Active 0.7 *** 3.7   1.22 *** 6.20 
 Yes Active 0.7  1.1   0.24  1.02 
#Treatment-years           
 No Inactive
 2,771     569   
 No Active 7,752     1,228   
 Yes Active 580     3,661   
# Patent appl.4   2,724     3,193   
# Treated firms   3,662     664   
# Firms   75,562     1,470   
Notes: ***, ** and * denote, respectively, significant estimate at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level. 1The FE sample 
includes patent data for the pre-support schemes period 1995-20012 Firms with zero patent application prior to 
treatment assignment, based on patent data since 1995. 3 Firms with zero R&D-activity before obtaining support. 
4During 2002-2013  
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Table 6. Effects of innovation policies on granted patents. Estimates of treatment 
response functions ( )x  and ( )x using the matching and fixed effects (FE) estimator, by 
main policy instrument and firm classification 
 
Policy Firm classification (x) 
Matching estimator 
 
FE estimator1  
 Prior Prior Est.   z-value     Est.   z-value 
 patents R&D         
Direct subsidies No2 Inactive
3 6.3 *** 11.2   1.23 ** 2.03 
 No Active
 0.8 ** 2.2   1.41 *** 4.61 
 Yes Active 1.1  1.1   -0.10  -0.67 
Tax credits No Inactive
 2.9 *** 6.1   0.82 
 
1.70 
 No Active 0.5 ** 2.1   1.18 *** 5.50 
 Yes Active 0.6  0.7   0.13  0.71 
#Treatment-
years  
    
  
   
 No Inactive
 2,771     252   
 No Active 7,752     673   
 Yes Active 580     2,113   
# Granted pat.4   2,040     2,380   
# Treated firms   3,662     570   
# Firms   75,562     1,187   
Notes: ***, ** and * denote, respectively, significant estimate at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level. 1The FE sample 
includes patent data for the pre-support schemes period 1995-20012 Firms with zero patent application prior to 
treatment assignment, based on patent data since 1995. 3 Firms with zero R&D-activity before obtaining support. 
4During 2002-2013  
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Table 7. Estimated Average Marginal Effect (AME), Sum of Marginal Effects (Sum 
ME) and expected number of patents per year given treatment (  ), by main policy 
instrument and firm classification. Estimates derived from the matching estimator 
Dep.  variable 
Firm classification 
(x) 
Main policy instrument 
 
Prior 
patents 
Prior 
R&D 
Direct support 
 
 Tax credits 
 
 
   AME  95%  CI
1   AME 95% CI1   
No. of appl. No2 Inactive
3 0.15 ** 0.02 0.29 0.15 0.01 *** 0.01 0.00 0.01 
 No Active
 0.02 *** 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 *** 0.01 0.01 0.02 
 Yes Active 0.21  -0.26 0.68 0.61 0.00 -0.28 -0.21 0.31 
No. of granted No Inactive
 0.13 ** 0.01 0.24 0.13 0.01 ** 0.00 0.02 0.01 
 No Active 0.01 *** 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 *** 0.00 0.01 0.01 
 Yes Active 0.12  -0.29 0.53 0.45 -0.02 -0.22 0.19 0.24 
   Sum ME 95%  CI
  Sum ME 95% CI  
No. of appl. No Inactive 129 ** 10 248  28 *** 12 45  
 No Active 52 *** 18 86  91 *** 46 136  
 Yes Active 58  -90 206  20 -103 143  
 Sum  239     139    
No. of granted No Inactive 120 ** 12 228  10 ** 1 19  
 No Active 17 *** 5 30  53 *** 25 81  
 Yes Active 20  -46 86  -7 -82 69  
 Sum  157     56    
Support 
intensity 
(million NOK)5  
          
   Mean  Med.   Mean Med.   
 No Inactive 1.59  0.81   0.42 0.29   
 No Active 1.43  0.80   0.48 0.37   
 Yes Active 1.88  1.16   0.59 0.48   
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significant estimates at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level. 1Confidence interval. 2Firms 
with zero patent application prior to treatment assignment, based on patent data since 1995. 3 Firms with zero 
R&D-activity before obtaining support. 4 95% confidence interval. 5Mean and median support per year during 
treatment in NOK million (100 NOK  11 EUR), by treatment category 
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Table 8. Estimated Average Marginal Effects (AME) when firm classification includes 
age (Type I) or size (Type II). Estimates derived from the matching estimator 
Dep.  variable Firm classification (x)  Main policy instrument  
 Prior  Prior  Firm- Direct support Tax credits 
 patents R&D Type (I, II) AME  95% CI
1 AME  95% CI1 
   Type I         
No. of appl. No2 Inactive
3 Incumb. 0.14 * -0.04 0.32 0.01 ** 0.00 0.01 
   Start-up 0.08 ** 0.01 0.16 0.01 ** 0.00 0.03 
 No Active
 Incumb. 0.03 *** 0.01 0.04 0.01 *** 0.01 0.02 
   Start-up 0.04 *** 0.01 0.07 0.01 ** 0.00 0.02 
 Yes Active Incumb. 0.39 -0.40 1.18 0.10 -0.02 0.23 
   Start-up 0.05 -0.38 0.47 -0.22 -0.50 0.06 
No. of granted No Inactive
 Incumb. 0.12 * -0.04 0.27 0.00 ** 0.00 0.01 
   Start-up 0.08 ** 0.00 0.15 0.01 * 0.00 0.02 
 No Active Incumb. 0.01 ** 0.00 0.03 0.01 *** 0.00 0.03 
   Start-up 0.02 *** 0.00 0.03 0.01 ** 0.00 0.03 
 Yes Active Incumb. 0.32 -0.24 0.87 0.13 -0.24 0.87 
   Start-up 0.03 -0.32 0.38 -0.18 -0.32 0.38 
   Type II       
No. of appl. No Inactive SME NA   NA  NA 
   Large NA   NA  NA 
 No Active SME 0.03 *** 0.01 0.02 0.01 *** 0.01 0.02 
   Large 0.04 -0.02 0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.03 
 Yes Active SME 0.02 -0.24 0.16 -0.04 -0.24 0.16 
   Large 3.19 * -0.43 2.76 1.16 -0.43 2.76 
No. of granted No Inactive SME NA   NA  NA 
   Large NA   NA  NA 
 No Active SME 0.02 *** 0.01 0.02 0.01 *** 0.01 0.02 
   Large 0.03 -0.02 0.09 0.01 -0.02 0.03 
 Yes Active SME 0.05 -0.18 0.27 -0.02 -0.19 0.14 
   Large 2.03 * -0.26 4.33 1.15 -0.25 2.55 
Notes: See notes to Table 7 
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Table 9. Post-Treatment Average Marginal Effect (PTAME)1 by main policy instrument 
and firm classification. Estimates derived from the matching estimator 
Dep.  variable Firm classification (x) Main policy instrument 
 Prior patents Prior R&D Direct support Tax credits 
   PTAME z-value
 95% CI2 PTAME z-value 95% CI 
No. of pat. appl. No3 Inactive
4 0.00 0.86 -0.01 0.01 0.00 1 0.00 0.01 
 No Active
 0.02 0.88 -0.02 0.06 0.01 0.93 -0.01 0.03 
 Yes Active -0.01 -1.28 -0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.53 -0.02 0.01 
No. of granted pat. No Inactive
 0.00 0.88 0.00 0.01 0.00 1.22 0.00 0.01 
 No Active 0.02 0.93 -0.03 0.07 0.00 0.54 -0.01 0.01 
 Yes Active -0.01 -0.84 -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.52 -0.01 0.01 
Notes: 1Estimated number of additional patents per year during the post-treatment period from 1
i
t T D    until 
min( 2 , )
i i
t T D E  , where 
i
E is the year of attrition or a new treatment assignment. 295% CI. 3Firms with zero 
patent application prior to treatment assignment, based on patent data since 1995. 4 Firms with zero R&D-activity 
before obtaining support 
 
 
Table 10. Share of treatment-years and share of total support, by the treatment’s main 
source of funding  
Share of treatment-years 
with support from 
Main source of funding 
 Direct subsidies (DIR) Tax credits (SKF) 
DIR 0.58 0.08 
SKF 0.42 0.92 
Share of total support from  
   
DIR 0.74 0.15 
SKF 0.26 0.85 
Note: If a firm may get support from both sources in the same year, the same firm-year is counted twice when 
calculated the shares 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
Table A.1. After matching: Share of R&D support, patent applications and firm-years. 
In percent, by industry, region and firm-size category 
     
Classification variable Direct 
support 
Tax credits Patent 
appl. 
Firm-
years 
 
 
Industry 
     
Primary industries 2.7 3.5 0.5 1.6  
Mining, oil and gas extraction 1.5 0.9 4.6 0.4  
Manufacturing      
  -Textiles and food 4.1 5.2 1.4 1.5  
  -Wood, pulp and paper 1.4 1.9 1.3 1.5  
  -Chemicals, pharma., rubber, plastic 4.4 3.3 2.5 0.4  
  -Metals, minerals 7.4 4.6 3.3 1.5  
  -Machinery and electronics 16.3 16.0 29.3 2.4  
Power prod., waste and recycling 1.4 1.3 0.6 0.7  
Information and communication 16.0 27.0 5.1 5.3  
Professional, scientific and technical 
services 
34.2 21.6 36.3 12.0  
Other services 10.8 14.7 15.2 72.8  
      
Region      
South 6.0 5.2 9.0 5.5  
East 53.3 52.2 52.4 56.6  
West 27.2 27.7 31.2 24.7  
Middle 11.1 10.2 6.0 6.7  
North 2.4 4.7 1.4 6.6  
 
Firm-size 
     
Small (<50 employees) 65.9 83.2 64.4 96.9  
Medium (50-249 employees) 14.1 12.8 13.2 2.6  
Large (250 employees) 20.1 4.0 22.4 0.5  
 
 
